Golden chervonets.
RSFSR, 1923. Diameter 22 mm.
As you know, the Soviet government began the first stage of the monetary IL reform in 1922-1923,
when the so-called sovznaks were issued. At the same time, at the end of 1922, the State Bank issued chervonets exchanged for gold. Since the chervonets contained gold at the level of "ten" in 1913, it was
already a stable currency.
At the second stage, in February 1924, treasury notes were put into circulation.
In addition, a bargaining silver and copper coin was minted. Thus, a unified
monetary system.
In order to avoid inflationary processes, the government in the autumn of 1923 began to carry out
"intervention" of the gold coin. The policy of intervention fell apart into two separate moments: it was the creation of the stability of the gold coin inside the country through the intervention of gold and the elimination of the leakage of the discarded gold abroad.
to the gold market. The bodies of Narkomfin (NKF) and the State Bank were entrusted with the first task, while the second one lay entirely with the bodies of the OGPU.
In addition to the struggle against the leakage of gold, the Chekists were entrusted with the task of combating the artificial increase in its exchange rate, that is, the suppression of all types of speculation within the country on this basis.
20 silver kopecks.
RSFSR. 1922 Diameter 22 mm.
The intervention of gold carried out by the State Bank did not lead to anything. It was noted that “the ongoing intervention generally does not achieve any positive results, both in terms of achieving a decrease in demand, and in the direction of lowering the prices of the free market for gold to create the stability of our chervonets”1. In Transcaucasia, the market was not saturated with discarded gold, and demand only increased. The price for ten reached 15 rubles. Taking into account that it was not necessary to count on the return of the sold gold back to the cash desks of the State Bank, since it flowed abroad, and it was impossible to eliminate the smuggling leakage, it was proposed to stop further intervention in Central Asia and Transcaucasia2. In turn, the excess
import of goods over export led to a reduction in stocks and foreign exchange which gave rise to speculation. In order to somehow stop the leakage of currency into private hands, in 1928 the gold ruble (chervonets) ceased to be freely convertible, that is, freely exchanged for money from other states according to official exchange rate. Only paper money and small change remained in circulation. The real value of the ruble fell rapidly. During the first five years, it decreased by more than 60 percent.
At this time, the task was to carry out industrialization in the country. These plans also needed money. Recalling the experience of the early 1920s, on May 17, 1928, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks instructed the People's Commissar of Finance N.P. Bryukhanov to work out the issue of a possible withdrawal of silver jewelry from museums, churches and other places in order to melt them down. At the same time, restrictions on the circulation of currency were introduced, and the forced withdrawal of currency and valuables from the population began.
On May 15, 1929, the NKF reported to the Politburo that starting from 1926-1927, the silver bank coin - the ruble and 50 kopecks - began to disappear from circulation and at the moment is almost completely not found in circulation. The next day, May 16, by decision of the Politburo, a commission was formed that considered the advisability of seizing silver from the population. The decision of the commission was unequivocal: to withdraw the silver coin from the population.
In response, in 1929, an even higher demand for small change from the population began to be noted. And this is despite the fact that the production and circulation of small silver and bronze coins were significantly increased: 30 million rubles of a silver coin against 13.4 million issued in 1927/1928. The issued silver was almost never returned to the cash desks of the State Bank. A particularly strong demand for a silver coin was observed from July 1929.
The Economic Directorate (EKU) of the OGPU, in circular No. 247 of November 14, 1929, asked to periodically cover the state of circulation of silver and bronze coins in the field, identifying change crises, interruptions in the supply of coins from the branches of the State Bank, non-issuance of coins from the cash desks of financial agencies and other institutions. It was also proposed to identify whether the purchase of small change silver, the connection of buyers with cashiers of financial agencies and other institutions, and other phenomena in this area were carried out, paying special attention to the border areas3.
On July 23, 1930, the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR decided, in order to eliminate the speculative demand for silver coins, to instruct the NKF, the People's Commissariat of Justice and the OGPU to wage a decisive fight against speculators and silver buyers, taking the necessary administrative measures. The NKF was instructed to make a corresponding reduction in the estimates of departments in connection with a reduction in the all-Union budget. Taking into account the report of the State Bank on the measures taken by it in connection with the difficulties with small change, it was considered necessary to increase the supply of small change in Moscow, Leningrad and areas of large grain and raw materials procurement.
In the circular of the ECU of the OGPU No. 210 for 1930, it was noted, on the basis of reports coming from the field, the lack of a sufficient amount of small change silver coins. In this regard, rumors about the absence of silver intensified. The speculative elements, in turn, began to create a stir around this issue, turning the silver coin into an object of their operations by artificially lowering the exchange rate of paper money in comparison with them. This led to frequent cases of local crises in the circulation of small change silver, which was especially undesirable among the peasantry when state agencies carried out economic measures for grain procurement.
ECU OGPU notified local authorities that the State Bank of the USSR has completely
sufficient availability of small change, which has already been sent out and will be sent in the required quantity in the future. At the same time, it was proposed to identify persons caught in the so-called counter-revolutionary agitation, and speculators who undermine the normal circulation of money. It was necessary to bring the perpetrators to justice through a special meeting. It was proposed to pay serious attention to the intermediate links of the trade and cooperative network, where cases of delay and seizure of small change by employees4 were established.
The installations for the seizure of silver were poorly carried out, in this regard, on August 12, 1930, cipher telegram No. 13198 was sent to the authorized representative offices of the OGPU by V. R. Menzhinsky. .
Since the beginning of the financial reform, 240 million silver coins have been issued into circulation,
As a result of the operation, 300 thousand were seized.
Menzhinsky reminded his representatives that it was their responsibility not only to carry out searches after searches, but also to follow up on the implementation of all measures to achieve a turning point in the collection of silver. The purpose of the operation was to accumulate a maneuverable fund in the amount of two tens of millions of rubles. Due to the fact that the operation was massive, the OGPU troops, schools and the police were involved in it.
Menzhinsky did not accept any references to grain procurements, mass inspections of the fire condition of factories, or the fight against counter-revolution. He proposed to continue operations until the silver was found, the results to be reported daily.
Silver hiders were punished severely. So, on August 18, Menzhinsky sent a telegram to Leningrad, in which he informed the authorized representative of the OGPU F.D. All persons passing through it were sentenced to death.
Menzhinsky suggested that Medved carry out the sentence immediately upon receipt of the telegram.
On August 21, the collegium of the OGPU, following the results of the operation to seize silver in Moscow, was sentenced to the highest measure of social protection:
"one. Bykov Efim Evgenievich, 68 years old, a native of Moscow, a cloakroom attendant at the Bolshoi Theatre. Found: 810 rub. silver, a large number of scarce goods and manufactories.
2. Leontiev Gavril Filippovich, 65 years old, cloakroom attendant of the Art Theatre. Found: 865 rubles. silver.
3. Korolev Nikolay Makarovich, born in 1878, cloakroom attendant at the Maly Theatre. Found: 449 rubles. 50 kop. silver.
4. Maksakov Emelyan Karpovich, 54, passenger cab driver. Found 500 rubles. silver coin.
5. Romanov Ivan Vasilyevich, born in 1883, employee, served with the Kurds, 1352 rubles were found. silver.
6. Rabinovich Khatskal Semyonovich, born in 1886, tavern maker, found 988 rubles. silver, 10 rubles. gold, 7 dollars.
7. Markov Alexander Ivanovich, born in 1889, merchant. Found: silver 400 rubles.
8. Shabanov Vladimir Alekseevich - cashier of the State Bank, 53 years old. Found 478 rubles. silver.
9. Artur Avgustinovich Volko, kulak, Duksky district, 52. Silver was found 397 rubles. 50 kopecks"5.
On August 20, the Politburo instructed the OGPU to strengthen measures to combat speculators and concealers of small change, including in Soviet-cooperative institutions.
At a meeting of the Politburo on August 25, it was decided to publish the following message in the newspapers: “The OGPU Board considered the case of a group of people involved in speculation and concealment of silver coins, as well as gold. The most malicious concealers, who at the same time are engaged in active counter-revolutionary agitation: Stolyarov Maxim Abramovich, Orlov Fyodor Pavlovich (8 people in total), who were found large sums various silver, the Collegium of the OGPU sentenced to death. The sentence has been carried out.
At the same time, the OGPU sent to concentration camps 438 speculators and concealers of silver coins for a period of 3 to 10 years from a number of regions and republics of the USSR”6.
As of September 27, 485,403 searches were carried out in the USSR in order to seize silver from the population; arrests - 9427; change coins were selected - 2,307,924 rubles.
Money and jewelry were confiscated as state revenue wherever possible.
So, on September 29, 1929, at the checkpoint at the Negoreloye station, letters sewn into a coat were confiscated from the French citizen Inessa Shuatel, who was traveling that day across the border from Paris to Moscow. During the customs inspection, the French woman Chouelle, by her behavior, inspired the controllers with suspicion, in connection
with this, she was invited to a separate room for a personal search. As a result of the search at
Shuatel were found smuggled under the lining of his coat with contraband items of clothing, estimated to be worth about 400 rubles. In addition, three letters were found in the same coat.
in Russian without address indication. Only one of the letters was signed by E. G. Kandyrina.
After reviewing the contents of the letters, it was established that the question in them was about the illegal sending of some valuables from the USSR abroad to Kandyrina.
From the letters it was clear that in the USSR there were valuables buried by some "owner" who, for their
storage Kandyrin allowed to pay 2-3 thousand rubles. One of the letters spoke of Boris, whom Kandyrina wanted to provide from the same values. One of the letters was intended for Feona Vasilievna and Ivan, who were supposed to take some silver and hand it over to Shuatel. These letters were sent to the Main Border Guard Directorate (GUPO).
On the day these letters were received from the border, Shuatel, who had arrived in Moscow, was summoned to the 2nd branch of the GUPO OGPU.
The interrogated Shutel testified that the letters were carried by Maria Gavrilovna Smirnova, Kandyrina's own sister; Boris Kandyrin, the son of an emigrant; Maria Egorovna Selezneva, former nanny of the Kandyrins; Feona Vasilievna Efimova and Ivan Ilyich Varlamkin, a former housekeeper and footman. Shutel admitted that, leaving annually for Paris, she received valuables and furs from Smirnova and took them abroad to Kandyrina. She did the same in
my last trip to Paris. Shutel also indicated the addresses of all the above persons.
Boris Kandyrin, who appeared for interrogation, stated that he had served in the Red Army; about everything he knows
he will say and asked only not to deprive him of the rank of commander of the Red Army. He said that the existence of treasures
he knew from the words of his mother, who left him in Novorossiysk, she herself was evacuated abroad.
He does not know exactly where it is hidden, but he heard that the diamonds were buried in a cache near Moscow at the dacha of a certain Bukin, who himself knows nothing about this treasure. The values at this dacha, according to him,
buried Seleznev and Smirnov. The silver was walled up in their basement former home. The place is known by Ivan and
Theon.
The most expensive values belong to his aunt Smirnova, but he does not know where she keeps them. Wherein
he pointed to a certain Trushina-Krasovskaya as a person close to Smirnova, whose last, perhaps,
and store valuables.
The search for valuables was divided into two parts. The first is excavations at the dacha with the help of Selezneva.
To this end, Kandyrin was invited to go with the OGPU officer Yakovlev to the village of Mitino.
to Selezneva, to show her a letter from Boris's mother, where she asks to dig up valuables and transfer them to Yakovlev, supposedly a representative of the French embassy, who will transport these valuables to Paris completely freely. Selezneva said that three years ago she and Smirnova dug up some of the valuables in the country. These valuables belonged to Smirnova, and she took them to Moscow.
On October 2, Yakovlev, Kandyrin and Selezneva arrived at the owner of the dacha, Bukin. They explained to him the purpose of their visit. We started digging. One box was dug up quickly. In other places, where there should have been six boxes,
dug from 8 o'clock in the morning until 3 o'clock in the afternoon without success. The excavations were continued by the staff of the GUPO, but
until late at night no results were given. The next day, the excavations continued and the rest of the banks were found.
As a result of excavations, royal paper money, royal gold coins, things with precious
stones in the amount, according to preliminary estimates, in gold terms 58-60 thousand rubles.
On October 4, during interrogation, Selezneva spoke about the family silver immured in the Kandyrin mansion.
The janitor Varlamkin and the former housekeeper Efimova were arrested. During interrogation, they told about the hidden
silver that was seized. Its approximate cost is 4-5 thousand rubles.
From September 30 to October 4, interrogations of Smirnova continued, which did not produce any results.
The only thing she confessed to was that with the Frenchwoman Choitel she sent to Paris
to his sister several coins of royal minting, one bracelet and two rings. Smirnova denied that she had any hidden valuables.
On October 5, an acquaintance of Smirnova, Kira Stepanovna Trushina-Krasovskaya, was summoned for interrogation.
admitted that two chests of Smirnova were kept in her apartment, and in her woodshed they were buried in
land two iron cans. As a result of excavations in a barn at a depth of one and a half meters, two high iron cans were discovered. In one of them were royal paper money, in the other. - values
exceptionally high cost. Two chests were also seized, they contained expensive items.
According to preliminary estimates, the value of the confiscated items in gold terms amounted to 156,400 rubles.
In total, valuables worth 220-230 thousand rubles were seized in this case.
In a letter dated 1931, Stalin was informed about the crime committed by the OGPU during the period of seizure
gold, silver and currency on the territory of the Belarusian military district. During the interrogations of those arrested at the station of the 15th border detachment, cases of obviously abnormal, criminal relations with those under investigation were registered, bordering on torture on the part of the persons interrogating them.
The arrested were beaten, deprived of food for two or three days, put in a cold room half-dressed, practiced a mock trial of them, used beatings and other unacceptable acts.
I. V. Grinevich, the head of the 15th border detachment, a member of the CPSU (b) since 1918, a worker-fitter, in the past an active participant in the fight against banditry, took part in all these criminal actions, in the organs of the Cheka
since 1918, as well as P. A. Nikanorov, M. 3. Mots, X. Yu. Sorits, M. I. Klimanov, A. Ya. Khilko and others.
Stalin was informed that all the above persons had been arrested by the BVO OGPU PP and were subject to trial by the OGPU collegium.
Stalin's resolution: "Isn't it very strict?" predetermined the fate of the above persons in the direction of mitigation of punishment. Four, including Grinevich, were expelled from the party, the rest got off with a severe reprimand.
OGPU Circular No. 404 of September 20, 1931 proposed to cover the entire territory served by plenipotentiary representations. At the same time, the circular pointed out the inadmissibility of the seizure
gold and silver household items - wedding rings, gold watches, earrings, rings,
crosses, chains to them, silver spoons, forks, knives, cigarette cases, confiscated by individual plenipotentiaries during previous operations. Such valuables could be withdrawn only in cases where
when it was clearly in the nature of storage for the purposes of concealment or speculation.
Considering that the OGPU bodies continued to confiscate valuable things from the population, a year later in circular No. 572
dated September 19, 1932, the ECU clarified once again that the seizure of gold and silver items from home
use should be made only in cases where their quantity is marketable and represents a currency value, or their storage is clearly speculative.
With the voluntary surrender of currency and valuables, it was proposed to release the arrested from custody. Persons stubbornly evading the surrender of currency, in the presence of strong investigative evidence in the IVF, were proposed to be prosecuted under article 59, paragraph 12, of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, sending cases to a special meeting at the OGPU collegium.
Attention was drawn to the inadmissibility of transferring the seized currency, gold and valuables to local customs or the GUPO. Under the personal responsibility of the heads of the EKO PP, it was proposed to send currency and valuables every five days through the field connection exclusively to the financial department of the OGPU according to the inventory with a mandatory copy of the ECU OGPU8.
On March 11, 1932, the results of the massive currency operation carried out in December-February were summed up. A number of bodies made arrests of a large number of people, because of which the investigative processing was carried out hastily and persons who had currency were released, although they later had it. General searches were noted, which, as a rule, did not give results. This was due to the fact that the currency, as a rule, was stored in the ground, firewood, and walls.
It was proposed to stop the mass operation and start a systematic "pumping out of the currency." To this end, it was proposed to create a special group in the authorized representative offices of the OGPU and in individual regional
departments and sectors. It was proposed to include “former” persons in the category of persons planned for development as currency holders.
It was proposed to pay attention to the suburban and suburban areas, where the deportees often lived.
former Nepmen from their permanent place of residence.
It was even proposed to develop an archive to identify currency holders sent to camps and places of exile,
and request these persons to withdraw their currency.
In view of the fact that a number of persons had fled from their place of permanent residence, it was proposed to adopt, with regard to
their active search activities. Particular attention should be paid to the identification of foreign
deposits and inheritances.
In the mail-telegram No. 125 / ECU dated February 5, 1932, it was indicated that in the process of conducting a currency
operations, there were cases when the OGPU bodies confiscated currency from persons who received it officially
on transfers from abroad or having it on current account Torgsin. Sometimes arrests were made
visitors to Torgsin shops, from whom small amounts of currency were confiscated, as well as confiscated
products and manufactured goods bought in Torgsin.
Such measures were said to terrorize small currency holders and cause significant outflows
currency receipts in Torgsin. The ECU of the OGPU proposed not only not to allow such actions themselves,
but also to stop such actions of the police and the criminal investigation department9.
In Circular No. 203 of February 26, 1932, the ECU pointed to the increasing cases of seizures of foreign currency from private recipients.
local authorities The OGPU began to arrest persons who received messages from
credit institutions valuable packages with foreign currency sent to the USSR through foreign banks.
Receipts for receiving currency on transfers were taken away from these people, after which they were released, and the currency was confiscated free of charge. In this regard, complaints began to be received from foreign banks against the actions of the OGPU, which gratuitously took away the currency transferred through Soviet banks. As a result of such withdrawals, the inflow of foreign currency from abroad was significantly reduced.
With this in mind, the ECU OGPU began to select transfers only in cases where there was specific information on criminal currency speculation at inflated prices, and to arrest these persons only red-handed at the time of the transaction.
On January 7, 1931, the OGPU reported to Stalin that in 1930 10,172,289 rubles had been handed over to the State Bank and Soyuzzoloto.
23 kop. in gold rubles, of which:
"a) Full foreign currency in banknotes - 5,890,377 rubles. 72 kop.
b) Gold in coins and ingots - 3,888,576 rubles. 04 k.
c) Miscellaneous silver (products, scrap, ingots, coins) - 393,235 rubles. 47 kop. "11, August 5, 1931 Politburo
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union (6) instructed the OGPU to check the availability of currency and gold funds from the regional and republican OGPU and
send all their cash to the State Bank within 10 days.
On May 4, 1932, the OGPU g once again reported to Stalin that the cash desk of the OGPU on May 1 of this year had: foreign currency - 750,000 rubles; gold in coins and ingots - for 1,650,000 rubles; only 2,400,000 rubles. Yagoda asked for instructions on the delivery of currency and valuables to the State Bank, while stressing that this amount, together with those previously handed over to the State Bank, would be equal to 15,132,403 rubles. Stalin was delighted: "I must say thank you to the Chekists." Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich agreed with him."
Politburo of the Central Committee on May 16, 1932 after the operation to seize currency and valuables from the population
instructs the commission consisting of Rudzutak, Grinko and Arkus to consider the advisability of
further withdrawal of silver from the population. It was decided to stop the seizure of valuables and currency from the population,
while deciding not to object to the export of silver from the USSR in ingots.
Government policy on this issue has been extremely inconsistent, the consequences of the confiscations are very
greatly affected the solvency of the population of the country.
Despite the fact that the OGPU bodies took serious steps to combat the smuggling of currency and
values, this work cannot be considered sufficiently effective. Low density border guard,
the lack of the necessary engineering equipment did not allow proper blocking of the tracks
illegal import and export of currency values and gold. AT more this applied to the sea coast, sections of the border of the Far East, Siberia, Turkestan, Transcaucasia, the north and north-west.
Carrying out decisions of party and legislative instances, bodies state security under
the leadership of Menzhinsky and Yagoda were forced to rob their own population ...
Notes:
1. CA of the FSB of Russia. F. 2. Op. 5. Then. 381. L. 248-249.
2. Ibid. L. 247-249.
3. Ibid. F. 66. Op. 1. Por. 261. L. 244.
4. Ibid. Since. 208. L. 365.
5. Ibid. F. 2. Op. 8. Por. 633. L.1-10.
6. Ibid. L. 94.
7. Ibid. L. 138-144.
8. Ibid. F. 66. Op. 1. Por. 232. L.277-278.
9. Ibid. Since. 254.
10. APRF. F. 45. Op. 1. D. 170. L. 62.
11. Ibid. D. 171. L. 35.
Text by O. Mozokhin, Ph.D.
In the late 1920s, the Soviet Union was close to bankruptcy. Where did the funds for industrialization come from?
By the end of the 1920s - the time when Stalin's sole power was established - the country of the Soviets was on the verge of financial bankruptcy. Gold and foreign exchange reserves did not exceed 200 million gold rubles, which was the equivalent of 150 tons of pure gold. It is negligible compared to the pre-war gold reserves of the Russian Empire, which in value reached almost 1.8 billion gold rubles (the equivalent of more than 1,400 tons of pure gold). In addition, the USSR formed an impressive external debt, and the country had to spend astronomical funds on an industrial breakthrough.
By the time of the dictator's death in March 1953, the gold reserves of the USSR had grown at least 14 times. As a legacy to subsequent Soviet leaders, Stalin left, according to various estimates, from 2051 to 2804 tons of gold. Stalin's gold box turned out to be larger than the gold treasury tsarist Russia. Far from Stalin was his main rival - Hitler. At the beginning of World War II, Germany's gold resources were estimated at $192 million, the equivalent of 170 tons of pure gold, to which must be added another 500 tons of gold looted by the Nazis in Europe.
What price was paid for the creation of Stalin's "stabilization fund"?
The royal gold treasury was thrown into the wind in just a few years. Even before the Bolsheviks came to power, more than 640 million gold rubles were exported abroad by the tsarist and Provisional governments in payment of war loans. In the ups and downs of the Civil War, with the participation of both whites and reds, they spent, stole and lost gold in the amount of about 240 million gold rubles.
But the "royal" gold reserves melted especially quickly in the first years of Soviet power. went to pay indemnities for a separate peace of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, which allowed Soviet Russia withdraw from the First World War, to "gifts" under the peace treaties of the 1920s to neighbors - the Baltic states, Poland, Turkey. Huge amounts of money were spent in the 1920s on fomenting a world revolution and creating a Soviet spy network in the West. In addition, tons of gold and jewelry expropriated from the "possessing classes" went to cover the deficit of Soviet foreign trade. With a complete collapse of the economy, the absence of exports and income from it, as well as difficulties in obtaining loans in the capitalist West, Soviet Russia had to pay for the import of vital goods with its national gold reserves.
In 1925, a US Senate commission investigated the question of Soviet exports of precious metals to the West. According to her, in 1920-1922 the Bolsheviks sold over 500 tons of pure gold abroad! The realism of this assessment was confirmed both by secret documents of the Soviet government and by the meager cash in the vaults of the State Bank of the USSR. According to the “Report on the Gold Fund”, compiled by the government commission, which, on the instructions of Lenin, examined financial position countries, on February 1, 1922 soviet state had gold for only 217.9 million gold rubles, and of these funds it was necessary to send 103 million gold rubles to pay off the state debt.
By the end of the 1920s, the situation had not improved. Russia's gold reserves had to be created anew.
In 1927, forced industrialization began in the USSR. Stalin's calculation that foreign exchange earnings from the export of agricultural products, food and raw materials would finance the industrial development of the country did not materialize: in the conditions of the global crisis that erupted in 1929 and the protracted depression in the West, prices for agricultural products fell hopelessly. In 1931-1933 - the decisive stage of Soviet industrialization - real export earnings annually were 600-700 million gold rubles less than expected, pre-crisis. The USSR sold grain at half or even a third of the pre-crisis world price, while millions of their own peasants who grew this grain were dying of hunger.
Stalin did not think about retreat. Having started industrialization with an empty wallet, the USSR took money from the West, Germany was the main creditor. Since the autumn of 1926, the country's external debt had grown by the end of 1931 from 420.3 million to 1.4 billion gold rubles. To pay off this debt, it was necessary to sell to the West not only grain, timber and oil, but also tons of gold! The meager gold and foreign exchange reserves of the country were melting before our eyes. According to the State Bank of the USSR, from October 1, 1927 to November 1, 1928, more than 120 tons of pure gold were exported abroad. In fact, this meant that all the country's free gold and foreign exchange reserves were used, plus all the gold industrially mined in that financial year. It was in 1928 that Stalin began selling off the country's museum collections. Artistic export turned into a loss for Russia of masterpieces from the Hermitage, the palaces of the Russian aristocracy and private collections. But the costs of an industrial breakthrough were astronomical, and the export of works of art could provide only a very small part of them. The largest "deal of the century" with US Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, as a result of which the Hermitage lost 21 masterpieces of painting, brought the Stalinist leadership only about 13 million gold rubles (the equivalent of less than 10 tons of gold).
Gold from the State Bank was delivered by steamships to Riga, and from there by land to Berlin, to the Reichsbank. In the early 1930s, gold cargo from the USSR arrived in Riga every two weeks. According to the American embassy in Latvia, which closely monitored Soviet gold exports, from 1931 until the end of April 1934, more than 360 million gold rubles (more than 260 tons) of gold were exported from the USSR through Riga. However, it was impossible to solve the problem of external debt and financing of industrialization at the expense of the gold and foreign exchange reserves available in the State Bank.
What to do? At the turn of the 1920s-1930s, the country's leadership was seized by a gold rush.
Stalin respected the economic achievements of America. According to eyewitnesses, he read Bret Hart and was inspired by the gold rush in mid-19th century California. But the Soviet-style gold rush was strikingly different from California free enterprise.
There she was the business and the risk of free people who wanted to get rich. The discovery of gold in California breathed life into the region, giving impetus to the development of agriculture and industry in the Western United States. California gold contributed to the victory of the industrial North over the slave-owning South.
In the Soviet Union, the gold rush of the turn of the 1920s and 1930s was a state enterprise whose goal was to finance industrialization and create a national gold reserve. The methods by which it was carried out gave rise to mass starvation, the zek's Gulag, the looting of church property, national museums and libraries, as well as personal savings and family heirlooms of their own citizens.
Extracting gold and currency, Stalin did not disdain anything. At the end of the 1920s, the criminal investigation department and the police transferred all the cases of "currency traders" and "holders of valuables" to the Economic Department of the OGPU. Under the slogan of combating currency speculation, “scrofulous campaigns” followed one after another - the seizure of currency and valuables from the population, including household items. In the course were persuasion, deceit and terror. The dream of Nikanor Ivanovich from Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita about the theatrical forced surrender of currency is one of the echoes of the "scrofula" of those years. The torture concert for currency traders was not an idle fantasy of the writer. In the 1920s, the OGPU persuaded Nepmen Jews to turn in their valuables with the help of their own melodies, which were performed by a guest musician.
But jokes aside, the OGPU also had frankly bloody methods. For example, the “dollar steam room” or “golden cells”: “foreigners” were kept in prison until they told where the valuables were hidden, or relatives from abroad sent a ransom - “salvation money”. The demonstrative executions of "currency and gold hiders" sanctioned by the Politburo were also in the arsenal of the OGPU's methods.
In 1930 alone, the OGPU handed over more than 10 million gold rubles worth of valuables to the State Bank (the equivalent of almost 8 tons of pure gold). In May 1932, the deputy chairman of the OGPU, Yagoda, reported to Stalin that the OGPU cash desk contained valuables worth 2.4 million gold rubles and that, together with the valuables that “were previously handed over to the State Bank,” the OGPU extracted 15.1 million gold rubles (almost 12 tons purity in gold equivalent).
At the very least, the methods of the OGPU made it possible to get large treasures and savings, but there were other kinds of values in the country. They were not hidden in hiding places or underground, ventilation pipes or mattresses. In front of everyone, they shone with a wedding ring on their finger, an earring in their earlobe, a golden cross on their body, silver spoon in a chest of drawers. Multiplied by the 160 million population of the country, these simple little things, scattered in caskets and sideboards, could turn into huge wealth. With the depletion of the gold reserves of the State Bank and the growth of foreign exchange appetite for industrialization, the leadership of the USSR grew stronger desire to take these savings from the population as well. I also found a way. The values of the population in the famine years of the first five-year plans were bought up by the shops of Torgsin - the "All-Union Association for Trade with Foreigners on the Territory of the USSR."
Torgsin was opened in July 1930, but at first it served only foreign tourists and sailors in Soviet ports. The depletion of gold and foreign exchange reserves and the need for industrialization forced the Stalinist leadership in 1931 - the climax of the madness of industrial imports - to open the doors of torgsins to Soviet citizens. In exchange for cash currency, the royal gold coinage, and then domestic gold, silver and precious stones, Soviet people received Torgsin's money, which they paid in his stores. With the admission of a hungry Soviet consumer to Torgsin, the sleepy life of elite stores ended. Torgsins shining with mirrors in large cities and unsightly little shops in godforsaken villages - Torgsin's network covered the whole country.
Torgsin's sad triumph was the terrible year 1933. Happy was the one who had something to hand over to Torgsin. In 1933, people brought 45 tons of pure gold and almost 2 tons of silver to Torgsin. With these funds, they purchased, according to incomplete data, 235,000 tons of flour, 65,000 tons of cereals and rice, and 25,000 tons of sugar. In 1933, food accounted for 80% of all goods sold in Torgsin, with cheap rye flour accounting for almost half of all sales. Those dying of hunger exchanged their meager savings for bread. Mirror shops of delicacies were lost among Torgsin's flour storehouses and sackcloth bags of flour. Torgsin's analysis of prices shows that during the famine, the Soviet state sold food to its citizens, on average, three times more expensive than abroad.
During its short existence (1931 - February 1936) Torgsin mined 287.3 million gold rubles for the needs of industrialization - the equivalent of 222 tons of pure gold. This was enough to pay for the import of industrial equipment for ten giants of Soviet industry - Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk, DneproGES, Stalingrad Tractor and other enterprises. The savings of Soviet citizens amounted to more than 70% of Torgsin's buying. The name Torgsin - trade with foreigners - is false. It would be more honest to call this enterprise "Torgsovlyud", that is, trade with the Soviet people.
The savings of Soviet citizens are the ultimate value. The OGPU, with the help of violence, and Torgsin, through hunger, almost completely devastated the people's money-boxes. But the gold was in the bowels of the earth.
On the eve of the First World War, in 1913, 60.8 tons of gold were mined in Russia. The industry was in the hands of foreigners, it was overwhelmingly dominated by manual labor. In the Civil War, the Bolsheviks defended all the known gold-bearing lands of the Russian Empire, but wars and revolutions destroyed the gold mining industry. Under the New Economic Policy, private miners and foreign concessionaires began to revive gold mining. It is paradoxical that with the state in dire need of gold, Soviet leaders treated the gold mining industry as a third-rate industry. They spent a lot of gold, but cared little about its extraction, living like a temporary worker at the expense of confiscations and buying up valuables.
Stalin paid attention to gold mining only with the beginning of the industrial breakthrough. At the end of 1927, he summoned the old Bolshevik Alexander Pavlovich Serebrovsky, who by that time had already distinguished himself in the restoration of the oil industry, and appointed him chairman of the newly created Soyuzoloto. In Soviet Russia, only about 20 tons of pure gold was mined that year, but Stalin set the task in a bold Bolshevik way: to catch up and overtake the Transvaal, the world leader that produced more than 300 tons of pure gold per year!
As a professor at the Moscow Mining Academy, Serebrovsky twice traveled to the United States to learn from the American experience. He studied technologies and equipment at the mines and mines of Alaska, Colorado, California, Nevada, South Dakota, Arizona, Utah, bank financing of gold mining in Boston and Washington, the operation of factories in Detroit, Baltimore, Philadelphia and St. Louis. He recruited American engineers to work in the USSR. Due to health problems, the second trip ended in the hospital. But the selfless work of Serebrovsky and his associates brought results. The flow of gold into the vaults of the State Bank began to grow. Since 1932, the "civilian" gold mining, which was under the jurisdiction of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry, was supplemented by Dalstroy - the gold mining of Kolyma prisoners.
The astronomical figures of the plans were not fulfilled, but gold mining in the USSR grew steadily from year to year. The fate of Serebrovsky was sad. He was appointed to the post of People's Commissar, and the next day he was arrested. They carried him out on a stretcher straight from the hospital, where Serebrovsky was treating his health, which had been undermined in the service of the Soviet state. In February 1938 he was shot. But the deed was done - a gold mining industry was created in the USSR.
In the second half of the 1930s, the USSR came in second in the world in gold mining, overtaking the United States and Canada and yielding, albeit by a huge margin, only to South Africa, whose annual production approached the 400-ton mark by the end of the decade. The West was frightened by the loud statements of the Soviet leaders and seriously feared that the USSR would flood the world market with cheap gold.
In the pre-war period (1932–1941), the convicts' Dalstroy brought almost 400 tons of pure gold to the Stalinist leadership. Non-GULAG "civilian" gold mining for the period 1927/28-1935 produced another 300 tons. There is no data on the work of "civilian" free gold mining in the second half of the 1930s, but if we assume that development proceeded at least at the same pace as and in the mid-1930s (an annual increase of 15 tons on average), then its pre-war contribution to the achievement of the currency independence of the USSR will increase by another 800 tons. Gold was mined in the USSR both during the war years and after it. AT last years Stalin's life, the annual gold production in the USSR exceeded the 100-ton mark.
Having created a gold mining industry, the country overcame the gold and currency crisis. As a result of the victory in World War II, the gold reserves of the USSR were replenished through confiscations and reparations. After the war, Stalin stopped selling gold abroad. Khrushchev unsealed Stalin's moneybox, who spent gold mainly on the purchase of grain. Brezhnev also actively spent "Stalin's gold", mainly to support third world countries. By the end of Brezhnev's rule, Stalin's gold reserves had melted by more than a thousand tons. Under Gorbachev, the process of liquidating the Stalinist treasury was completed. In October 1991, Grigory Yavlinsky, who was in charge of economic aid negotiations with the G7, announced that the country's gold reserves had been reduced to about 240 tons. The USSR's main adversary in cold war, USA, accumulated by that time more than 8000 tons.
Stocking up gold in all possible, and often criminal and reckless ways, Stalin accumulated funds that ensured the influence of the USSR in the world for several decades to come. However, it was a disservice to Russia. Stalin's gold reserves extended the life of an inefficient planned economy. The Soviet era ended with Stalin's gold treasury. The leaders of the new post-Soviet Russia had to create a new national gold and foreign exchange reserves.
Elena Osokina, Doctor of Historical Sciences, author of the book "Gold for Industrialization: TORGSIN"
In the twentieth century, there were a number of examples when the authorities of certain countries confiscated gold from the population. Moreover, in some cases it was open violent actions, while in others the population actually gave its gold to the authorities.
Perhaps the first such example is the German Empire during the First World War. As their financial resources were depleted, the country's authorities turned to the population with a request to give their savings to the fight against enemies. The patriotic appeal "Steel instead of gold" was widely supported by the population, and ordinary Germans gave away their gold, receiving paper stamps in return. The outcome of this is well known. Germany still lost the First World War, and the paper stamps received by the German population turned into dust during the period of hyperinflation that followed the defeat.
The next episode of the confiscation of gold from the population was the October Revolution in Russia. Here the new government acted harshly, in fact seizing gold and all other valuables from those who had them. Safe boxes banks were opened, searches were carried out, and everything of value was taken away without any compensation. Another event of similar magnitude in Russia is the seizure of almost all of the gold reserves of the Soviet Union during the periods of Gorabchev and Yeltsin and its sale to the West.
The third widely known episode of the struggle between the authorities and the population with gold was the United States. Roosevelt's decree imposed severe restrictions on gold ownership individuals. True, the Federal Reserve paid for the withdrawn gold with its tickets, but a year later the currency was devalued, and an ounce of gold became equivalent not to 20, but to 35 dollars.
In 1935, fascist Italy again called for the patriotism of the population, especially women. As a result of this call, B. Mussolini managed to collect, among other things, only wedding rings containing 35 tons of gold. The result was the defeat of Italy in World War II and the hanging of Mussolini, and the Italians, even after fifty years, were ashamed that they so easily succumbed to propaganda and parted with their wedding rings.
The next major seizure was the German theft of Czech gold in London in March 1939. The operation involved the Bank for International Settlements, based in Basel, Switzerland. It positions itself as a bank of central banks and seems to be a completely non-political structure. However, it was this institution that played a key role in the financial preparation of Germany for the Second World War and the theft of Czech gold. Naturally in favor of the Reich. The Bank of England acted as an accomplice in this. Everything was done in such a way that outside the extremely narrow circle of trusted persons in central banks and BMR. On March 20, 1939, shortly after the Germans entered Prague, the BIS received an order from Prague to transfer Czech gold to the account of the German Reichsbank. In turn, he gave an order to the Bank of England, and he complied with the order of the BIS to transfer gold. Within a few days, the gold was sold and the currency transferred by the Germans to other accounts. Prior to this, it was true that the decision of the British Parliament forbidding any operations with Czech funds, since the British quite reasonably expected that the Germans would try to capture the Czech financial resources, but who is the English parliament for the Bank of England to listen to when the Bank of England thinks in its own way? When the scandal broke out, the money was already gone.
The most recent examples of such state looting are the looting of Iraqi gold by the Americans and 144 tons of Libyan gold by the British. For the sake of this, they even organized a couple of wars. Everything else was also attached, but it was gold that was the goal of the campaigns against S. Hussein and M. Gaddafi.
There were other examples, but these were probably the largest in terms of centralized robbery. Forms and methods were different, but as a result, in one way or another, the authorities tried to take gold from the population or from other nations. One can speculate on whether gold today is money or not, but there is no doubt that its capture is still a reason for unleashing wars or carrying out possible confiscations from its own population.
On Friday, 10/05/12, I posted a new book “Money of Troubled Times. Muscovy, Russia and its neighbors in XV-XVIII centuries." It is located at the same address as below.
My books “The collapse of “money” or how to protect savings in a crisis”, “Gold. Citizen or State, Freedom or Democracy”, “Entertaining Economics” and “Money of Troubled Times. Ancient History" can be read or downloaded at http :// www. proza. ru/ author/ mitra396
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visits since 30.07.2010 msimagelist> "Gold Rush" Campaign OGPU to identify and seize gold from the population in 1923-1929 . By the end of the 1920s - the time of the establishment of the sole the power of Stalin I.V.. - country Soviets was on the brink of financial bankruptcy. Gold reserves USSR did not exceed 200 million gold rubles, which was the equivalent of 150 tons of pure gold. Negligible compared to the pre-war gold reserves of the Russian empire, which in value reached almost 1.8 billion gold rubles (the equivalent of more than 1,400 tons of pure gold). In addition, the USSR had an impressive external debt, and the country had to spend astronomical funds on industrial jerk. Royal the gold treasury was thrown into the wind in just a few years. Even before the arrival Bolsheviks to power, more than 640 million gold rubles were taken abroad by the tsarist and Provisional governments in payment military loans. In the vicissitudes civil war, at participation and whites, and the Reds, spent, stole and lost gold in the amount of about 240 million gold rubles. But the “tsar's” gold reserves melted especially quickly in the first years of Soviet power.
Gold went to pay contributions on separate peace of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, which allowed Soviet Russia to withdraw from World War I, for "gifts" under peace treaties of the 1920s to neighbors - Baltic states, Poland, Turkey. Huge amounts of money were spent in the 1920s on inciting the world revolution and the creation of a Soviet spy network in the West. AT 1925 commission Senate The United States investigated the question of the Soviet export precious metals to the West. According to her, in 1920-1922 the Bolsheviks sold more than 500 tons of pure gold abroad. The reality of this assessment was confirmed both by secret documents of the Soviet government and by the meager cash in vaults. State Bank USSR. According to the "Report on the gold fund", compiled by the government commission, which, on instructions Lenina V.I. surveyed the financial situation of the country, 1 FV 1922 the Soviet state had gold for only 217.9 million gold rubles, and of these funds it was necessary to send 103 million gold rubles to pay off the state debt.
In addition, tons of gold and jewels, expropriated from the "possessing classes", went to cover the deficit of the Soviet foreign trade. Those who gave the gold were released on the condition that personally write a statement about their "voluntary donation" of gold to the Industrialization Fund Soviet Republic. With complete collapse economy, lack of exports and income from it, as well as difficulties with loans for capitalist Western Soviet Russia had to pay for import vital goods to national gold reserve. In the Soviet Union, the gold rush of the turn of the 1920s and 1930s was a state enterprise whose goal was to finance industrialization and create a national gold reserve. The methods by which it was carried out gave rise to a massive famine, Gulag, property looting churches, national museums and libraries, as well as personal savings and family heirlooms of their own citizens.
Extracting gold and currency, Stalin I.V. didn't skimp on anything. In the late 1920s, criminal investigation and militia handed over all the cases of "foreign exchangers" and "holders of valuables". Economic Department of the OGPU. under the slogan fight with currency speculation, "scrofulous campaigns" followed one after another - the withdrawal of currency and values the population, including household items. In the course were persuasion, deceit and terror. Part of the clergy, represented by the Renovation Church, supported the seizure of church valuables. In his appeal from 1922 leaders This church was declared: “And now, before our eyes, such a difficult thing has happened with the conversion of church values for bread for the hungry. This should have been a joyful feat of love for a dying brother, but it turned into an organized uprising against state power.
This caused blood. Blood was shed in order not to help Christ - the starving. By refusing to help the hungry, church people tried to create a coup d'état. Appeal of the Patriarch Tikhon became the banner around which the counter-revolutionaries rallied, dressed in church clothes and moods. But the broad masses of the people and the majority of the rank-and-file clergy did not follow their call. The people's conscience has condemned the perpetrators of the shedding of blood, and the death of those dying of hunger falls as a heavy reproach on those who want to use the people's calamity for their political purposes.
We, the undersigned clergymen of the Orthodox Church, who are spokesmen for broad church circles, condemn the actions of those hierarchs and those pastors who are guilty of organizing opposition to the state authorities to help the starving and in its other undertakings for the benefit of the working people. "In the 1920s, the OGPU persuaded the Jews - Nepmen turn in valuables with the help of their own melodies, which were performed by a guest musician. The OGPU also had frankly bloody methods. For example, "dollar steam room" or "golden cells": "foreigners" were kept in prison until they told where the valuables were hidden, or relatives from abroad they will not send a ransom - "salvation money". Demonstrative executions of "currency and gold hiders", sanctioned by the Politburo, were also in the arsenal of methods of the OGPU.
In 1930 alone, the OGPU handed over to the State Bank valuables worth more than 10 million gold rubles (the equivalent of almost 8 tons of pure gold). AT MY 1932 Deputy Chairman of the OGPU Yagoda G.G.. I.V. in gold terms). By the time of death dictator The gold reserves of the USSR grew at least 14 times. As a legacy to subsequent Soviet leaders Stalin I.V. left, according to various estimates, from 2051 to 2804 tons of gold. Stalin's gold box turned out to be larger than the gold treasury of tsarist Russia. Far from Stalin I.V. was his main rival - Hitler. In n. During the Second World War, Germany's gold resources were estimated at $192 million - the equivalent of 170 tons of pure gold, to which approx. 500 tons of gold looted by the Nazis in Europe.
Balts Bank Central (Bank of Russia)
Economics of Stalin Katasonov Valentin Yurievich
"Golden exodus" from Soviet Russia (1917–1925)
Data on official gold reserves in the very early years Soviet power absent, but it can be assumed that the gold treasury of the state was rapidly emptying. For reference: on December 31, 1913, the gold reserve of the Russian Empire, according to official data, was equal to 1233 tons. In addition, at that moment there were 382.5 tons of gold coins in circulation. In total, together with coins, gold in circulation in Russia was 1312.5 tons. This was a record amount of gold in the entire history of Russia at that time. In terms of official gold reserves, on the eve of World War I, Russia was in second place after the United States (54% of the US level), ahead of such countries as Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy.
During the First World War, Russia had to say goodbye to part of its gold reserves (the main loss was gold that was sent to England as collateral for British loans). At the time the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, the state treasury had about 850 tons of gold. In 1925, the gold reserves of the USSR amounted to only 141 tons. - more than 700 tons.
Soviet Russia was rapidly losing the gold reserves that the Bolsheviks inherited from the Russian Empire. Two stages of the "golden exodus" can be distinguished: 1) 1918–1920; 2) 1921–1925
First stage (1918–1920) was characterized by large outflows of gold abroad, which led to the loss of at least a quarter of the country's gold reserves, inherited by the Bolsheviks after the October 1917 coup. First of all, it is necessary to single out the leaks of: a) "Lenin" gold; b) "Kolchak" gold.
Leakage of "Lenin's" gold. We are talking about gold, which Russia transferred to Germany as an indemnity in the second half of September 1918 in accordance with the agreements within the framework of the so-called Brest Peace. The Bolsheviks managed to transfer only part of the “Leninist” gold provided for by the agreements (93.5 tons out of 200 tons). After the final defeat of Germany in the First World War, "Lenin's gold" (literally 3-4 months after it arrived to the Germans) was transported to France for "temporary storage". Later, France and Great Britain divided this gold in half (apparently, as the victorious countries). They forgot about Russia as the legal owner of gold. Soviet Russia at the Genoa Conference in 1922 and later the Soviet Union at various conferences and on various occasions raised the issue of "Leninist" gold, but until the end of its existence, the USSR did not receive from its former allies in the Entente not an ounce of "Leninist" gold. True, according to some (unverified) reports, N. Khrushchev allegedly managed to use the claims for "Lenin's" gold to partially settle France's counterclaims to repay the obligations of the USSR as the legal successor of the Russian Empire under Russian bonds held by French citizens.
Attention should be paid to another channel for the leakage of gold from Russia in 1918, when Lenin was negotiating peace with Germany. We are also talking about "Lenin" gold, but that part of it, which was placed on the on-call accounts of Swiss banks. The fact is that, while negotiating among themselves within the framework of the so-called Brest peace, both the Soviet and German sides in the autumn of 1918 were already fully aware that the world war could soon end (naturally, with the defeat of Germany), so they agreed that financial resources from Russia will be sent to swiss banks to so-called on-call accounts (i.e., demand accounts that only top German leaders would have access to) to protect the funds from the claims of the victorious countries (i.e., the Entente countries). This agreement was implemented, but the Germans did not get access to the accounts, Swiss bank accounts were opened at the last moment for individual party leaders of Soviet Russia. True, we are talking about the transfer to Swiss banks not of physical, but of “paper” gold (that is, foreign exchange funds, not metal).
"Leakage" of "Kolchak's" gold. This gold is part of the gold reserves of the Russian Empire, which was stolen in 1918 by the White Guards and White Czechs from a storehouse in Kazan. As a result, it ended up in the hands of the Kolchak government, which placed it in the vaults of the Omsk branch of the State Bank.
A generalized picture of the movement of the gold reserves of Russia in the first year after the October Revolution of 1917 in terms of value is given by a table compiled by the Russian émigré historian S. Petrov. As can be seen from Table 13, at the end of 1918, Russia's gold reserves were still very solid - 780 million gold rubles, which, in terms of pure gold at the gold parity of the ruble, was about 600 tons, that is, almost? gold reserves of the State Bank of the Russian Empire on the eve of the First World War.
Table 13. Movement of Russia's gold reserves from November 1917 to November 1918
Source: Petroff S. Where did the Russian gold go? Report on the Russian gold reserves (1914–1929) // Nezavisimaya gazeta. - 1999. - November 30.
The Kolchak government sent this gold in several batches abroad in order to use it to pay for the supply of weapons and military equipment. In total, over 6 thousand pounds were exported abroad. "Kolchak" gold, which was approximately 1/5 of the stock that was in the vaults of the Omsk branch of the State Bank (ie, no more than 100 tons). Most of the "Kolchak" gold after the capture of Omsk by the Bolsheviks and the capture of Kolchak was returned to the vault of the State Bank in Kazan. It should be noted that the problem of the leakage of Russia's gold reserves in the form of "Kolchak" gold today is overly exaggerated by many authors, and it is given a sensational connotation.
According to various estimates, which differ little from each other, of all the gold that was sent by the Kolchak government abroad, a little more than half was used to purchase weapons and equipment - 3232 pounds, or about 50 tons. A significant part of the remaining foreign "Kolchak" gold ( 2800 pounds) was used by the Russian emigration.
Together, the leakage of "Lenin" gold and "Kolchak" gold can be estimated at about 250 tons.
Second phase (1921–1925) At this stage, there was an intensive transfer of the remaining gold reserves of Russia abroad. Proceeds from the traditional export of goods were at an extremely low level and covered only an insignificant part of all foreign exchange expenditures of Soviet Russia.
Covering the foreign trade deficit with gold. Suffice it to say that in 1921, receipts from traditional exports (flax, hemp, grain, oil products, timber, etc.) amounted to 12.1 million gold rubles, and the total amount of foreign exchange expenditures was 340 million gold rubles. Part of the currency was "earned" in 1921 by selling art paintings and other works of art (9 million gold rubles), furs through the Leipzig Fair (2.4 million gold rubles), as well as diamonds (7 million gold rubles) . Thus, less than 10% of all foreign exchange expenditures of Soviet Russia were covered in 1921 through the sale of traditional export goods, as well as various non-currency valuables (including church property). The remaining expenses (more than 300 million gold rubles) were covered by the sale of precious metals from the state fund. For four financial years(from 1922/23 to 1925/26 inclusive) was used from the gold fund of the state of currency values in the amount of 126.7 million gold rubles, which, in terms of pure gold, is equivalent to 98 tons of metal.
"Extraordinary" export of gold. In addition to the export of gold to meet the current needs of the country in foreign currency (for the purchase of food, the maintenance of embassies abroad, for trips abroad, etc.), there was an unconventional (or emergency) export of the yellow metal. This should include the following categories of gold (grouping according to the declared purpose of export):
1) gold of the Comintern ("Comintern" gold) - to finance the world revolution (specifically - to create and maintain communist parties, terrorist organizations, publish party literature, conduct intelligence through the channels of the Communist International, etc.);
2) "Baltic" gold - to satisfy the property claims of some "independent" states that were previously part of the Russian Empire (Estonia, Latvia, Poland);
3) "locomotive" gold - for the purchase of new and repair of existing locomotives and wagons.
We note right away that the official goals of exporting gold from Soviet Russia were often used only as a "cover" for the personal enrichment of a number of party and government officials of the country, as well as for the enrichment of their foreign "partners" in the person of bankers and various entrepreneurs. Here is what, in particular, V. Shambarov writes about the “Comintern” gold: “Huge funds flowed from Russia to prepare the revolution. In fact, it has been postponed, postponed over and over again. In a word, it turned out to be a “feeding trough”, on which someone warmed their hands well.
At the same time, in 1921 and in the next two years, there was an active plundering of gold from state funds under the pretext of fighting for a world revolution, which looked especially monstrous against the backdrop of the terrible famine of 1921-1922. The sources of gold supplies abroad were not only the official reserves of the metal (they were concentrated in those years in the Gokhran of the RSFSR, which was headed by Yurovsky), but also various party funds. The movement of gold through such cash desks was not controlled by state authorities, but was under the jurisdiction of individual party leaders - especially those who were related to the work of the Comintern. However, there was also no effective control over the use of the Gokhran's valuables; there were direct thefts and other abuses in relation to the state gold reserves.
The peak of spending the country's gold and foreign exchange reserves during the period under review fell on 1921; in 1922, these costs were significantly lower, and in 1923-1925. amounted to very modest amounts.
Let us say a little more about the emergency exports of the gold reserves.
Gold of the Comintern. According to numerous sources, in the period from 1919 until the defeat of the Trotskyist bloc in the country (the second half of the 1920s), various valuables were sent abroad, including gold, other precious metals, precious stones, and currency to help " fraternal parties” and preparations for socialist revolutions in other countries (according to official versions). No estimates of the export of gold from the Comintern have been found in the literature. Obviously, the supply of gold from the Comintern abroad was poorly documented or not documented at all (for the purpose of secrecy), so it is rather difficult to trace the fate of this gold. According to our estimates, the total amount of exported gold of this category amounted to about 200 tons.
"Baltic" gold. Some part of the gold reserves of Russia was transferred on the basis of interstate agreements to the new states that after 1917 withdrew from the Russian Empire - Lithuania, Latvia, Finland and Poland. According to some data, the indicated states in 1920-1921. a total of 48 million rubles worth of gold was allocated, i.e., approximately 37 tons.
"Steam" gold. Russian gold also sailed abroad under the guise of paying for contracts for the supply of food and other goods, but primarily for railway locomotives and other Vehicle(the so-called "locomotive" gold). First of all, we are talking about transactions for ordering steam locomotives in Sweden and the USA, as well as for the repair of rolling stock in Estonia. An amount of 300 million gold rubles was allocated for the "locomotive" operation, which is equivalent to more than 230 tons of pure gold.
Sending gold abroad under the guise of paying for various contracts to the accounts of American and other bankers is qualified by some historians as a kind of indemnity that the Bolsheviks paid in exchange for the right to exist for the Soviet Republic, given that it had the opportunity to satisfy the needs for rolling stock at the expense of its own production capacities.
Some of the contracts turned out to be fictitious, for others the prices were inflated, which made it possible for state and party functionaries to accumulate fortunes abroad; at the same time, their foreign partners were also enriched.
The geography of the flow of Russian gold (both “locomotive” and “Comintern”) abroad was quite simple: first it was delivered from storage facilities to the Baltic republics (primarily Estonia) and Sweden, and then from there it was sent by sea mainly to the United States, and partly to countries Western Europe.
Let us sum up some results on the estimates of the export of gold in 1921–1925. Although by the end of 1920 the country's gold reserves, inherited by the Bolsheviks, had noticeably “shrank”, however, according to our estimates, it was still equal to almost half of the reserve that Russia had on the eve of the First World War. During the period from the end of 1920 to the end of 1922, the Bolsheviks managed to take out of the country the main part of the gold they inherited from the tsarist and provisional governments, plus the gold that they stole during various confiscations of property from the population and the Church.
Extraordinary sources of replenishment of the gold reserve. In addition to the state gold reserves that the Bolsheviks inherited from the Russian Empire, they partly satisfied their needs for the yellow metal from some other sources. Gold mining during this period amounted to only a few tons per year and could not be considered as a significant source of replenishment of the gold reserve. A much larger influx of gold was provided by various kinds of confiscations and voluntary-compulsory surrender of currency values by the population of the country. On April 16, 1920, a decree was issued on the confiscation of gold and jewelry from all residents of Russia, it at least somehow regulated the procedure for voluntary-compulsory surrenders. Prior to this, confiscations were carried out without any legal grounds under the pretext of fighting class enemies and resembled ordinary robbery.
The confiscation of church valuables, among which there were many items made of gold and other precious metals, was carried out in 1922 under the pretext of finding funds to fight hunger. On January 6, 1922, the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the seizure of church property was published, and on February 26, an instruction on the procedure for the seizure of church valuables that were in the use of believers. All church property (gold, silver, platinum, diamonds, etc.) in terms of silver was valued at 525 thousand pounds. According to various sources, only a tiny part of the collected funds was directed to the purchase of food. In general, the operation to seize church valuables by September 1922 brought 8 trillion. rub. in banknotes in 1922, and only 3 million rubles were spent on the purchase of bread and other food products for the starving in 1922.
In 1922, the forcible seizure of gold from the population began to gradually curtail, giving way to a more or less civilized purchase of gold, followed by its concentration in the State Bank and the People's Commissariat of Finance (Gokhran). The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 4, 1922 abolished the mandatory surrender to the state of the population's gold, silver, platinum (in coins, ingots, products), as well as precious stones and currency. Soon, a resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) dated July 27, 1922 was adopted, which provided state and cooperative enterprises and institutions to accept precious metals and currency as payments. They had to immediately transfer the incoming currency values to the State Bank for crediting to their current accounts. The State Bank was given the monopoly right to buy gold and silver coins. He also received a pre-emptive right to purchase foreign currency received as a result of foreign trade.
This text is an introductory piece. From the book Reconstruction of World History [text only] author8.11.3. THE VOYAGE OF NEVIAH (NOAH) AS THE OUTCOME OF ONE OF THE TRIBES OF ISRAEL AND THE EXODUS OF THE ISRAEL AT THE CRUSADER COLUMN
From the book GRU Empire. Book 1 author Kolpakidi Alexander IvanovichBirth of Soviet military intelligence (1917–1921)
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From the book My Mission in Russia. Memoirs of an English diplomat. 1910–1918 author Buchanan GeorgeChapter 22 1917 Trepov resigns. - Prince Golitsyn as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. “My last audience with the emperor. - The Union Conference and its outcome In early January, Trepov, considering that he could not head the government while Protopopov remained
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From the book Book 2. Development of America by Russia-Horde [Biblical Rus'. The Beginning of American Civilizations. Biblical Noah and medieval Columbus. Revolt of the Reformation. dilapidated author Nosovsky Gleb Vladimirovich12.4. The voyage of Neviah-Noah as the exodus of one of the tribes of Israel is the exodus of the Israelites from Spain under the crusader Kolon. As we have seen, the Mormon Bible says that the voyage of Neviah-Noah and Jared-Horde was the voyage of one of the tribes of Israel who left the land of Egypt
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From the book Voices from Russia. Essays on the history of the collection and transmission abroad of information about the situation of the Church in the USSR. 1920s - early 1930s author Kosik Olga Vladimirovna From the book History of State and Law of Ukraine: Textbook, manual author Muzychenko Petr PavlovichChapter 13. FORMATION OF THE SOVIET STATEHOOD IN UKRAINE (1917-1920) 13.1. General historical overview The October Revolution of 1917 in Petrograd ushered in an era of domination by one of the most terrible ideologies of the 20th century, the goal of which was the world socialist revolution. But at that